Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

1980

"On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeering
G. Robert Blakey
Notre Dame Law School

Ronald Goldstock

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
G. R. Blakey & Ronald Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
341 (1979-1980).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/23

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.

"On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor
Racketeering
G. ROBERT BLAKEY*
RONALD GOLDSTOCK**

Labor racketeering in America is a pervasive, persistentproblem not
easily controlled by conventional criminal statutes. The authors
examine the applicability of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizationsstatute (RICO) to the problem of labor racketeering
and look at the recent case of United States v. Scottoas an example
of the Act's applicationin this area. The authors conclude that to the
extent that it is used appropriately and with discretion, RICO
provides the flexibility to be an important law enforcement tool
against labor racketeers.
"Trucking, construction, and waterfront entrepreneurs
have been persuaded, for labor peace, to countenance gambling, loan sharking and pilferage. As the takeover of organized crime cannot be tolerated in legitimate business so,
too, it cannot be tolerated here."'
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF LABOR RACKETEERING
Labor racketeering, the use of union power for personal benefit, has been
aptly characterized as a pervasive and dreaded disease, a "cancer that almost
destroyed the American trade union movement."' 2 The McClellan Committee
in the 1950's uncovered systematic racketeering in the Butchers, Bakers,
Distillery Workers, Operating Engineers, Carpenters, Textile Workers, Hotel
and Restaurant Employees, and Teamsters Unions, among others.3 Of the
fifty-eight persons arrested at the 1957 Apalachin conference, twenty-two
were involved in "labor or labor-management relations." '4 Law enforcement
officials report that, at least in some localities, organized crime's misuse of
* Professor of Law, Cornell University; Director of the Cornell Institute on Organized Crime. Professor
Blakey was chief counsel to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee which drafted Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. A.B. 1957, J.D. 1960, Notre Dame University.
** Former Director of the Cornell Institute on Organized Crime and presently Deputy Inspector
General of the U.S. Dept. of Labor. A.B. 1966, Cornell University; J.D. 1969, Harvard University. His
participation in this article predates the later position and the views expressed herein do not necessarily
represent the position of the Department of Labor.
The authors wish to thank Peter Gilbert, Eric Glitzenstein, and Lisa Rogovin for their valuable
research
assistance.
1. S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969).
2. D. DUBINSKY & A. RASKIN, DAVID DUBINSKY: A LIFE WITH LABOR 145 (1977).
3. Hutchinson, The Anatomy of Corruption in Trade Unions, 8 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 136 (1969).
4. R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 228 (Popular Library ed. 1960). The Apalachin meeting, held in
upstate New York in 1951, has been described as a "conclave of the high chiefs of the mob." A.
SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND His TIMES, 175 (1978).
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union power has multiplied since the Apalachin meeting, 5 and Attorney
General Benjamin Civiletti6 estimated that 300 union locals "are severely
influenced by racketeers."
The tribute exacted by labor racketeers is reflected in higher prices to the
consuming public. The social cost of union corruption, however, cannot be
counted solely in dollars and cents. The public inconvenience occasioned by
illicit strikes and work slowdowns, the violence that frequently punctuates the
operation of labor rackets, especially where organized crime is involved, 7 and
the loss of union democracy as a treasured value must also be recognized.
Most important are the long-term effects of labor racketeering on the nation's
overall well-being. Reputable firms may be completely driven from racketinfested industries, 8 and those that stay necessarily compromise their business
ethics. Racketeering undermines public confidence in the collective bargaining system and jeopardizes the reputations of all honest trade unionists. The
persistence of racketeering in certain segments of the economy (transportation and construction, for instance) advertises an apparent structural flaw in
our political institutions, 9 and is, as stated by Mr. Civiletti, "a very serious
national problem."' 10
This article will examine the phenomenon of labor racketeering in America. Part I A examines the most common forms of contemporary labor
racketeering, misuse of fringe benefit funds, "sweetheart" contracts, strike
insurance schemes, and other attempts to reduce competition in industry. The
article next examines an important statutory weapon used against this
problem, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization statute, and
looks at the recent case of United States v. Scotto as an example of the statute's
application against labor racketeering activities.
A. LABOR RACKETEERING

Despite the revelations of the McClellan Committee,1' the traditional labor
rackets-fund misuse, sweetheart deals, and strike insurance-continue to
operate. The primary developments of the last twenty years involve merely an
increased sophistication by labor racketeers in the conduct of these rackets
and a recognition that union power can serve to promote a variety of licit and
illicit syndicate activities.
5. See, e.g., Labor Management Racketeering: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 77 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
1978 Hearings]; IIT RESEARCH INSTrrUTE, A STUDY OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN ILLINOIS 220 (1971)

(labor racketeering now "the prime activity" of organized crime in East Saint Louis) [hereinafter cited as
ILLINOIS].

6. 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 9.
7. See, e.g., N. GAGE, MAFIA,U.S.A. 329-30 (1972) (two A & P store managers killed, and several A &

P outlets burned, when company resisted racketeers' demands to market their detergent soap).
8. See, e.g., ILLINOIS, supra note 5 at 221; N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1975, § A at 29, col. 1.
9. An Assistant District Attorney concluded his summation in a recent racketeering prosecution by
asking for a verdict "that lets the [victims] of this world know that it is America, a verdict which lets the
[defendant Teamster officials] know that they are not a government unto themselves." N.Y. Times, May
20, 1979, § A, at 37, col. 6.
10. 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 9.
11. L. VELIE, LABOR U.S.A. 198 (1959).
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1. Fringe Benefit Fund Misuse
The great increase in fringe benefit remuneration in the last twenty years
and the resulting increase in labor pension, health and welfare trust funds has
made the potential for racketeering substantial. There are approximately
75,000 union locals in the United States, 12 and many locals maintain more
than a single benefit fund. The Teamsters organization controls more than a
thousand funds, with total assets of $9 billion.' 3 Their Central States
Pension Fund, which investigations have shown to be the favorite bank of
organized crime, contains more than a billion dollars. 14 Although some
corrupt unionists still steal members' dues, 15 it is, as a practical matter,
unnecessary; the opportunities are greater and the risks slighter in manipulating welfare and pension funds.
Benefit funds derive their assets primarily from employers, in amounts
determined by the collective bargaining agreement. While in principle,
income is invested and the total assets are used to benefit the membership, this
is not always the case. Corrupt trustees may draft the governing trust
agreement to keep legitimate pay-out well below income. It is a common
practice in the pension fund area to keep the number of pensions that "vest"
at approximately ten percent.' 6 Racketeers in a New York mason tenders
union found a better way: they took the checks earmarked for the welfare
fund and cashed them. 7. The rank and file were too intimidated to complain.
Disposition of the accumulated surplus is accomplished through a variety
of devices. Payments may be made to lawyers, accountants, or "consultants"
for fictitious services, or for the purchase of goods intended for the exclusive
18
use of fund racketeers.
Misuse of investment discretion is, however, the major conduit for
diverting union funds into racketeer pockets. These illicit loans are of two
types. First are those intended primarily as income for the racketeers.
Sometimes these loans constitute simple embezzlement, circuitous ways of
distributing spending money to fund insiders. The borrower functions as a
"bag man," and the loan is never repaid.' 9 More commonly, the borrower is
solvent and well-intentioned, but the racketeer exacts a commission, or kickback, for arranging the deal. 20 The second type of loan is designed primarily
12. 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 9 (statement of Benjamin Civiletti).
13. J. KWITNY, VICIOUS CIRCLES 159 (1979).
14. D. MOLDEA, THE HOFFA WARS 289 (1978).

15. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 95.
16. ILLINOIS, supra note 5, at 181. See L. VELIE, supra note 11, at 202-04; J. KwrrNY, supra note 13, at
161-65.
17. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, An Investigation of Racketeer Activities in
Mason Tenders' Union Locals in the New York MetropolitanArea, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 233-40
(1970) [hereinafter cited as ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT]. Mason tenders, or hod carriers, do the heavy
manual labor on construction sites, supplying bricks and mortar to the more skilled craftsmen.
18. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 94.
19. See, eg., NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATIONS, Report of an Investigation
Concerning the Infiltration and Financial Investments by Organized Crime Elements in Legitimate
Businesses and the Improper Use of Union Welfare Funds, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, 353-73
(1975) [hereinafter cited as SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT].
20. Anthony "Tony Pro" Provenzano, who took over New Jersey Teamsters Local 560 in 1961 after the
murder of incumbent Tony Castellito, was sentenced to four years in prison "for conspiring to split a

$230,000 kickback on a $2.3 million loan from his local's pension funds." Provenzano's co-defendant was
Anthony Bentro, the principal in a Wall Street investment firm. Wall St. J., July 12, 1978, at 45, col. 2.
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to underwrite the speculations of the borrower. While the fund racketeer may
demand a kick-back, the transaction is better understood as a contribution to
capital, or even as a gift. Favored insiders,
moreover, tend to have little
difficulty in securing the desired loan. 21
2. The "Sweetheart" Contract
While the underlying crime in labor-management collusion varies in
specific cases from bribery to extortion, the economic nexus in all these
sweetheart deals is the low price, not the supply, of labor. Labor-management
collusion is most pervasive in the construction industry, 22 with trucking a
close second. 23 Illicit payments may also be made to union representatives for
the privilege of using non-union
labor, 24 and for not organizing workers
25
within the union's jurisdiction.
A more sophisticated use of the sweetheart arrangement enables the
employer to choose with whom he will negotiate, rather than dealing with the
officials his employees select. The consequences are clearly beneficial to both
employer and the employee negotiator he selects, and the potential for
personal gain is not lost on organized crime. Use of the "racket" unionist is
also advantageous to the employer: once contractual relations are established
between the employer and the union, rival legitimate unions are ordinarily
barred from organizing activity for three years.26 Labor law is thus sometimes
more effective than an army of professional sluggers.
3. Strike Insurance
While the strike threat has increasingly been used by organized crime as a
means to advance licit and illicit syndicate enterprises, both professionals and
amateurs in a number of industries continue to profit from the sale of labor
peace for cash. For example, in a continuing Justice Department investigation
into "all aspects of illegal activity" on the docks, Fred Field, general
organizer for the International Longshoreman Association (ILA) and Presi21. A 1977 audit of the Culinary Workers Pension Fund revealed that over 60% of the Funds' $43
million was lent to Morris Shenker. Shenker also owed the Teamsters $164 million at mid-1976, and $23.5
million to Pipefitters Local 562. N.Y. Times, March 4, 1977, § A at 10, col. 1. Shenker operates the Dunes
Hotel and Casino, and was also attorney and confidant of Jimmy Hoffa. L.A. Times, April 20, 1977, at 22,
col. 1.
22. See, e.g., Washington Post, May 13, 1978, at 1, col. 1 (builders paid $4.50 per hour to truckers on the
job site where prevailing rate was $7.00 per hour); ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra notel7, at 224-25
(contractors skip benefit payments to members by paying off union officers).
23. See J. KWITNY, supra note 13, at 174 (trucking executives estimate that 80% of the truckers in the
New York metropolitan area "are receiving pay and benefits below the National Market Freight
Standard").

24. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1969, at 34, col. 4 (by paying to use non-union help, builders saved
$1.3 million); Wall St. J., March 28, 1973, at 12, col. 3 (furriers' union officers received $35,000 to allow
unionized manufacturers to sub-contract with non-union shops).

25. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1970, at 54, col. I (Laborers Union business manager accepted $16,500 "loan"
from employer in return for not organizing employer's workers).
26. This rule is referred to as the contract-bar rule. See American Seating Co., 106 NLRB 250 (1953);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,

167-69 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
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dent of the New York District Council, was convicted in 1977 for extorting
$124,500 from the United Brands Company. 27 Witnesses testified that Field
received $500 for each shipload of bananas unloaded during walkouts, and
$35,000 for insuring labor peace in 1974.28 Among the union leaders and
shipping executives indicted as a result of that probe are Anthony Scotto
(President of ILA Local 1814) and Anthony Anastasio (Executive Vice
President of Local

1814).29

Strike insurance has also surfaced since the McClellan hearings in the meat
retailers industry, 30 the building services, 31 the garment trades, 32 and, of
course, the trucking industry, 33 which share a similar economic vulnerability
to delay.
While payments for labor peace are a factor in many industries, they are a
nation-wide institution in the construction industry. In fact, the only relevant
development in the industry since the turn of the century has been an3 4increase
in contractor vulnerability due to the cost inflation of walkouts.
Particularly significant to investigators is the increasingly sophisticated
method of payment for strike insurance. No longer is cash received in the
booth of a hotel bar. 35 Today, with varying degrees of expertise, payments are
camouflaged among the countless checkbook transactions of the victim's
business. A common device is the "phantom" employee, in which a victim
pays strike insurance to a racketeer through his payroll system. 36 Although
frequently effective, careless racketeers may render this technique perilous;
for example, the head of a mason tender's local was paid for Ill hours in a
single week; 37 David Kaye, chief steward of the McCormick Place Teamsters,
15 payrolls simultaneously, and one day was paid for 66 hours of
was on
work. 38
4. Racketeering in Licit Business
The modern racketeer enjoys a competitive advantage in licit businesses
through illicit practices, including the misuse of union power. Control of a
union and its assets allows the new mobster to manipulate the supply and cost
of labor to his own businesses, and more importantly, to those of his
competitors.
27. Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1977, at 19, col. 1.
28. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1977, § A, at 24, col. 2.

29. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 2. The Scotto indictment is considered in Part IV of this
article as an example of the application to the problem of labor racketeering of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. [Hereinafter referred to
as RICO], 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976). See note 177 infra.

30. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1969, § A, at 38, col. 2.
31. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1977, § B, at 5, col. 3.

32. Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1975, at 12, col. I (business agent of I.L.G.W.U. Truckers Local 102 indicted
with five others for shaking down an undercover garment trucking concern).
33. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1979, § A, at 28, col. 5 (five individuals indicted for receiving $76,000 from
New Jersey trucking companies in exchange for "labor peace").
34. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 5, at 47 (statement of Robert Stewart).
35. R. CHRISTIE, EMPIRE IN WOOD 234 (1951).

36. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1979, § B, at 2, col. 1.
37. ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 223.
38. Wall St. J., June 30, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
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Mob-controlled businesses have also used mob-dominated unions to secure
needed capital at favorable rates, unavailable to others in similar business
39
situations. This has been accomplished directly through benefit-fund loans
or indirectly through legitimate lending institutions. The President of the
United Paperworkers International, Joseph Tonelli, was indicted in 1978 for
"depositing union pension funds in various banks to induce those banks to
lend money to various customers." 40 Leaders of the New Jersey Teamsters
and Retail Store Employees Unions "busted," or bankrupted, four banks by
arranging loans to a "parade of characters whose names read like the index to
the Valachi hearings." 4 1 One borrower, a twice convicted armed robber, got
his loan while serving seven-to-ten years in Trenton State Prison. He applied
42
one day while he was on work release.
Since 1900, labor racketeers have periodically, and for diverse reasons,
attempted to reduce or eliminate competition within their industry. 43 By
threatening to strike recalcitrant employers, the union "enforces" a pricefixing scheme or an anti-competitive allocation of work, thus selling labor
peace for the ability to dictate the victim-firm's business practices. Their
methods need not necessarily involve an elaborate bid-rigging operation;
instead, they simply remove firms they do not like. Racketeers in East St.
Louis, Illinois for example, have driven all the reputable builders from their
domain. "No contractor from outside the area has ever made a profit" on a
job in East St. Louis "due to the prevailing labor racketeering practices." 44
A combination of Teamster strike threats and sweetheart deals has been
used extensively to establish monopolies for mob-controlled companies. A
monopoly may be established by the use of a "whip" company, which,
because it is permitted to use non-union help, can underbid competitors for
contracts.4 5 If that is ineffective, pressure may be applied directly to the
customer. The regnant monopolists can then "name their own price, provide
bad to indifferent service,
and otherwise put a squeeze on the customers
46
within their control."
II.

SOCIAL CONTROL OF LABOR RACKETEERING THROUGH LAW

While there have been numerous legislative attempts to control labor
racketeering at both the state and federal levels, 47 a major prosecutorial
39.
40.
41.
42.

See notes 19-21 supra, and accompanying text.
Wall St. J., July 20, 1978, at 16, col. 1.
Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
Id.

43. P. TAFT, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT 10 (1958).

44. ILLINOIS, supra note 5, at 221.
45. L. VELIE, supra note 11, at 171.
46. Interim Report of the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., 330 (1958).
47. Prior to the adoption of RICO, a number of legislative schemes were employed to combat labor
racketeering. Various federal statutes were used to prosecute certain activities that reflect symptoms of a
criminal syndicate's infiltration and control of a labor union. For example, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1976), has been applied to extortion by union officials. See, e.g., United States v. Palmotti, 254
F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958) (Hobbs Act applies to threatening employers with strikes and work slowdowns).
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problem has been the difficulty in demonstrating the nature of the charged
illegal activity in the context of syndicated crime. 48 Labor racketeering is not a
single crime; it includes the infiltration, domination, and use of a union for
personal benefit, generally by members of various organized criminal
groups. 49 Labor racketeering thus comprises both traditional overt physical
crime and more sophisticated covert white-collar offenses. 50 The challenge of
law enforcement has been to demonstrate that relationship-the invidious
nature of white-collar crime when committed by a criminal group as an
element of a pattern of racketeering activity.
Traditionally, the relationships among the various acts and participants of
racketeering were not the proper subject of proof.51 Except for the restrictive
federal conspiracy statute, 52 criminal law was concerned with the commission
of specific illegal acts by named individuals. 53 The notion that the defendant
Illegal conversion of union funds is prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1976) (prohibits embezzlement from
labor organizations), and 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1976) (prohibits embezzlement from employee benefit plans).
Statutory provisions which attempt to prevent the corruption of labor officials by parties who are not
members of the union include 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1976) (provides for federal sanctions against the bribery of
employee benefit plan operators), the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (intended to limit illegitimate
employer interference in the collective bargaining process).
On the state level, various criminal codes contain provisions used to prosecute activities associated with
labor racketeering, which can be categorized into four areas of criminal activity:

§

-Extortion, see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A, §§ 8-13 to 15 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A:105-4 (West 1969);

-Embezzlement, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.20.280 (1970) (embezzlement by
employee); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 518-519 (West 1970);
-Bribery, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-2-3(1) (1978) (bribery of labor representative); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4108 (Purdon 1973) (commercial bribery and
soliciting commercial bribery); and
-Infiltration, see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312(A) (1978) (illegal control of
an enterprise); HAW. REV. STAT. § 842-2 (1976).
48. Address by G. Robert Blakey, Legislative Approaches to Organized Crime Control, at National
Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office of Attorney General (Mar. 19, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Blakey Speech].
49.U.S. TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, ANNOTATI6NS AND CONSULTANT'S PAPERS 5 (1967); McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics.:

Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 140 (1970).
50. U.S. TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, ANNOTATIONS AND CONSULTANT'S PAPERS 5 (1967).
51. See note 47 supra; J. MCCLELLAN, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 268 (1962). Although
conceivable that general conspiracy law could be used against organized labor racketeering activity, under
the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), "the precise nature and extent of the conspiracy
must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objectives." Braverman
v. United States, 371 U.S. 49, 53 (1943). This principle severely limits conspiracy prosecutions against the
diversified criminal groups that infiltrate and control unions. It is extremely difficult to infer a singular
agreement or common objective from the commission of diverse crimes by apparently unconnected
individuals. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978); cf Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S.
539 (1947) ("chain conspiracy" requires awareness of single unified purpose and knowledge of existence of
remote links); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) ("wheel conspiracy" requires interaction
and agreements between spokes as to common illegal object). Consequently, conspiracy law has been of
limited utility in the context of labor racketeering.
52. Id.
7
53. See note 4 supra. A prosecution concerned only with convicting an individual for one underlying
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was a member of a criminal group was thought to be not only irrelevant but
prejudicial. 54 That the defendant had committed a related offense in the past
was likewise excluded from jury consideration. 55 Yet it was precisely those
relationships-of crime to crime, and defendant to group-which distinguished organized crime from conventional acts.
These dual realizations, that such relationships were the crucial factor in
demonstrating the existence of syndicated crime, and that syndicated crime
by its very nature was significant, formed the philosophical foundation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Chapter of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 (RICO). Conviction under RICO requires that
the prosecution must prove, not only that the defendant committed an
offense, but also that he
did so as a member of a group engaged in a pattern of
56
racketeering activity.
What follows is an overview of RICO as a statutory scheme designed to
combat the realities of syndicated crime and as a remedial tool for the control
of labor racketeering.

III.

RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS STATUTE
A. AN OVERVIEW

The RICO statute, enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, is primarily, but not exclusively, intended to halt organized crime's
incursion into legitimate organizations. 57 The statute is exceptional in many
respects. RICO prohibits "racketeering activities," which are defined by
reference to twenty-four separate types of federal crimes and eight different
state felonies.5 8 RICO does not make illegal any specific action which was
previously legal, since all acts punishable under RICO are also punishable
under either state or federal statutes. Rather RICO states that if a person
commits two of these offences he is guilty of "racketeering activity" 59 and is
therefore subject to additional penalties. The umbrella effect of the RICO
statute adds the concept of "enterprise" to a criminal prosecution, requiring
additional proof of a "pattern" of racketeering activity and its relationship to
offense deemphasizes the crime's severity when committed by a member of a criminal group as part of a
pattern of racketeering activity. More importantly, conviction of one syndicate member for an underlying
offense fails to loosen the syndicate's hold on the labor union. Note, Title IX, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations,4 J.L. REF. 614, 622 (1970). Instead, conviction of one member leads to use of the
"promotion system," whereby other members of the criminal group replace the convicted individual. S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78(1969).
54. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (prejudice found); contra Benger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) (prejudice not found). Cf. People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 73 N.Y.S.
806 (1901) (the state cannot prove any crime against the defendant not alleged in the indictment to aid in
proving that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged).
55. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, §§ 300-373 (1961).

56. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
57. Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). See S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969) (legitimate businesses in which organized crime is reportedly
involved includes advertising, florist shops, car dealerships, football franchises, real estate, and securities).
58. A listing of these crimes is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(A)(B) (1976).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
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an "enterprise" in addition to that required to prove the individual crimes
alleged. The statute is broad and varied in its application and is designed to
meeE the variety of crimes utilized by organized criminals who invest in,
acquire, infiltrate, and use legitimate and illegitimate organizations.
RICO has been effective as a weapon against organized crime since it
allows the government to attack such crime not only by focusing on
individual offenses, but also enterprises or patterns of racketeering. Prior to
RICO only isolated incidents of criminal activity were prosecuted and it was
nearly impossible to reach legitimate businesses which served to launder
money.
The criminal provisions of RICO delineate four crimes: (1) investment of
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise; 6° (2)
acquisition of an interest in any enterprise through racketeering activity; 61 (3)
participation in any enterprise through racketeering activity; 62 and (4)

63
conspiring to violate any of the above proscriptions.
Violation of any of the prohibitions of section 1962 may result in a fine of
$25,000, imprisonment for twenty years, or both, plus forfeiture of ill-gotten
gains,64 as well as any interest the defendant has acquired or maintained in a
business in violation of Title IX.65 The statute also allows imposition of broad
civil remedies, modeled after the antitrust laws. 66 RICO thus permits the
harshest penalty authorized
by Title 18 of the United States Code, except for
67
homicide offenses.
An unusual feature of RICO is its language providing that "provisions of
68
this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
This appears to reject the traditional canon of statutory construction that
penal statutes should be narrowly interpreted, and any ambiguity should be
resolved in favor of leniency. 69 Such an appearance, however, is misleading in
light of the canon that statutes be reasonably construed. 70 The purpose of

60. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976).
64. Butsee United States v. Marubeni AmericaCorp.,No. 79-1327(9th Cir. Jan. 10, 1980) (§ 1963(a)(1)
forfeiture provision applies only to interests "in an enterprise" conducted illegally and not to income
derived from illegal operation of the enterprise (ill-gotten gains)). Marubeni appears to be wrongly decided.
The statute states that "'all property or other interest" is to be forfeited. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976) (restores the sanction of criminal forfeiture which was abolished by the
first Congress, Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (1790)). See Taylor, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963-RICO's Most Powerful Weapon. 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379 (1980).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976) (court may impose treble damages, may order the divesting of interest,
or may order injunctive relief).
67. See, Schultz, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83
YALE L.J. 1491, 1493 n.16 (1974).
68. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 904, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
69. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 38-41 (2d ed. 1947); see United States v.

Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1021 (D. Md. 1976), afJd per curiam by an equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653
(1979) (en banc) (district court in construing RICO held that state government was not an enterprise) (in
the absence of clear congressional intent, courts traditionally should be reluctant to give a broad
construction to a criminal statute which would transform matters primarily of local concern into federal
felonies); cf United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973) (Hobbs Act does not reach the use of
violence to achieve legitimate union objectives such as higher wages).
70. C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.12 (1973).
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RICO is to build another remedy upon other criminal offenses. 71 Because the
Act deals with degrees of criminality there is no reason to limit its
construction by resort to judicial maxims narrowly construing criminal
statutes.
What follows is a discussion of the developing case law under RICO and
some of the issues that remain to be resolved by the courts.
B. THE DEFINITIONAL CONCEPTS

To determine how broadly RICO applies it is necessary to define and
construe its elements. In general, to prove a RICO violation, the prosecution
must show that a person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt directly or indirectly invested, maintained an
interest, or participated in an enterprise whose activities affect interstate
commerce.
The building block concepts of RICO which are most often litigated are:
"person, .... enterprise," and "pattern of racketeering."
1. Person
Section 1961(3) provides that "person" includes "any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." 72 As a matter of
statutory construction courts will generally afford "includes" a broader
interpretation than the word "means." 73 This canon of construction is
premised on the assumption that "including" is not a restrictive term, but one
of enlargement. 74 Such an interpretation conveys the conclusion that
items
not specifically enumerated may still be "included" in the statute. 75
Specifically construing RICO, the Ninth Circuit found that the statute was
crime 76
intended to reach individuals and associations as well as organized
and that there are no restrictions as to particular persons.77
2. Enterprise
To establish a RICO violation, a person must acquire or maintain an
interest in, or control of, an enterprise, or conduct or participate in the
71. Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
72. See Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 69 J. CRIM. L. 1 (1978).
73. Highway & City Freight Drivers, Local 600 v. Gordon Trans., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1978)
("person" held to include a labor union under Bankrupty Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1(23) (1970)), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1002 (1978).
74. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, Washington-Baltimore Local v. NLRB, 462 F.2d
887, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (statutory interpretation of person in National Labor Relations Act of 1947, 29

U.S.C. § 152(1), (1970)).
75. Argosy Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1968) ("including" is not a restrictive term, but
should be considered in relation to the rest of a phrase).
76. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975) (includes small business enterprises, and is
not limited to people involved in organized crime), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); cf. United States v.
Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (persons not in violation of RICO merely by being "reputed to
be an organized crime member"; there must be a § 1962 violation).
77. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970) (RICO not limited to persons who specifically
intend to utilize interstate facilities), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
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conduct of an enterprise's affairs. 78 The statutory provision provides that an
"enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact,
though not a legal entity." This definition, like the one of "person," is one of
illustrative expansion, not limitation.
Since its passage in 1970, RICO has been consistently applied not only to
illegal, racketeer controlled enterprises, but also to legitimate enterprises. 79
The recent case of United States v. Swidski involved a defendant who owned
all of the stock of 4 corporation which operated as a restaurant in Washington, D.C.80 The corporate records were kept in a room on the third floor of
the building in which the restaurant was located. 81 It was established that over
a period of several months narcotics trading had occurred in this room. 82 The
United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia found that the
defendant, while engaged in the food business, also used the restaurant as a
cover or front for illegal trafficking of cocaine.83
In analyzing the concept of an "enterprise" the court initially turned to the
statutory definition of section 1961(4) and held that the restaurant fell within
the statutory definition. 84 Secondly, the court looked at the congressional
intent to liberally construe the entire RICO statute.85 Citing United States v.
Stofsky8 6 the court found that a legitimate business may take many forms and
that the original goals may be perverted or may continue while the enterprise
becomes a front for an unrelated criminal activity.8 7
In a further exploration of the "enterprise" element the Second Circuit in
United States v. Parness held that a hotel, clearly within the definition of
"enterprise," was not excludable because of its location in a foreign country.88
An "enterprise," therefore, is not to be limited to a domestic corporation.
Arguments attempting to limit the scope of enterprise which exclude
government agencies from its reach have been unsuccessful in the courts.8 9 In
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1262(b) (1976).
79. United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (legitimate restaurant served as a front for
narcotics trafficking), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2056 (1979); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.
1978) (auto dealership), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595
(7th Cir. 1978) (beauty college); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) (foreign corporation
an enterprise within meaning of statute), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. DePalma, 461
F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (theater).
80. 593 F.2d 1246, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. id. at 1248.
85. Id. at 1248-49.
86. 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
87. 593 F.2d at 1248-49.
88. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
89. United States v. Fruniento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and
Beverage Taxes is an "enterprise" as defined in RICO), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v.
Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (police department is an "enterprise" under RICO), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 904 (1978). The only aberration is the district court opinion in United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp.
997 (D. Md. 1976), where one of the enterprises in the indictment was the government of the State of
Maryland. The district court stated (incorrectly) that the legislative history was silent with regard to
whether governments were included in the word "enterprise." It concluded that Congress had only private
entities in mind when defining enterprise and it dismissed the RICO count which utilized the government
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United States v. Brown, the Police Department of the City of Macon, Georgia,
was found to be an "enterprise. " 90 The district court noted that at the very
least the police department consisted of a group of individuals associated in
fact and suggested, but did not definitively hold, that they were a "legal
entity." 9' Secondly, the court noted that there was no statutory distinction
between public and private entities. 92 The language of the statute was held to
be broad enough to include both. 93 Based on the statutory language,
legislative history, and case law, the court concluded that a government
94
agency was properly classifiable as an enterprise under RICO.
Very similar reasoning was followed by the Third Circuit in finding a state
cigarette and beverage bureau to be an enterprise within the meaning of
RICO. 95 To support its conclusion, the court pointed to the congressional
concern over the increasing number of ways racketeers were infiltrating into
legitimate organizations, 96 which thus should include private and public
organizations.
In United States v. Campanale, the court upheld RICO against an
argument that the statutory definition of "enterprise" was unconstitutionally
vague and ambiguous. 97 In that case, members of a local Teamsters union
were found to be an enterprise. 98
Recently courts have been asked to determine whether RICO applies to an
enterprise or organization which is criminal in nature. Four circuits have
found that an illegal enterprise may be prosecuted through the use of RICO.99
of the State of Maryland as the "enterprise."
We would cite the following from the Statement of Findings and Purpose for P.L. 91-452 (Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970):
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophistocated,
diversified, and wide-spread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption; . . .
(3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business
and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes;
(4) organized crime activities in the United States . . . threaten the domestic security, and
undermine the general welfare of the nation and its citizens; . . . (emphasis supplied) I U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1073 (1970).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

555 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416.
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).

96. Id. at 1090-92.
97. 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).

98. Id.
99. Second Circuit: United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979) (RICO not unconstitutionally
vague and can be applied toward illegal enterprises; however, court cautioned against undue prosecutorial
zeal in invoking RICO); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) (exempting illegal
enterprises from RICO would leave loophole), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
Fifth Circuit: In five decisions since 1976, the court has found "enterprise" to have broad meaning that
is not limited to legitimate enterprises. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978) (court would
"deny society the protection intended by Congress were [they] to hold that the Act does not reach those
enterprises nefarious enough to diversify their criminal activity"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United
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A discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Altese too
illustrates the rationale of the other circuit courts. The enterprise in question
consisted of a large-scale gambling business. The district court found section
1962(c) to apply only in the case of legitimate enterprises infiltrated by
persons connected with organized crime. 10 1 The decision was reversed on
appeal. The court of appeals first noted that the statute referred to any
"enterprise." The majority reasoned that the word "any" is explicit and then
cited the Webster's Dictionary definition to include illegal enterprises under
RICO's provisions. 102 Furthermore, the court reasoned that if Congress
wanted to eliminate illegal enterprises from the scope of RICO it could have
inserted a restrictive word, however, they failed to do so. 103 Consequently, the
Second Circuit held that an illegal enterprise was not exempt from the
strictures of RICO, and stated that to hold otherwise would be contrary to
legislative design. 10 4
In dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland claimed that the court "radically
extends federal jurisdiction to virtually every criminal venture affecting
interstate commerce." 105 The dissent in its discussion did not give weight to
the argument that "any" expands the meaning of "enterprise," 06 and felt that
a review of the legislative history left no doubt that Congress never intended
that "enterprise" extend beyond legitimate businesses or organizations. 01 7 The
dissent contended that the entire "raison d'etre" of the enterprise was to carry
on criminal conduct, and therefore, since the defendants did not invest in,
acquire control, or employ the resources of a legitimate business enterprise, 108
part of the indictment should be dismissed. 109
The Sixth Circuit in deciding United States v. Sutton found that section
1962(c) does not apply to illegal enterprises.1 0 The decision steered away from
the precedent set in other circuits and found for the appellants. This court
interpreted section 1962(c) as pertaining to an enterprise "organized and
acting for some ostensibly lawful purpose, either formally declared or
informally recognized." ' This interpretation was supported by the court's
States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977) (prostitution ring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978);
United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (police taking bribes), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904
(1978); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976) (cheating at cards); United States v.
Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976) (gambling).
Seventh Circuit: United States v. Capetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (statutory language and
legislative history of RICO would include within its reach an illegal enterprise actually connected with a
legitimate billiards hall), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). Capetto was extended by United States v.
Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1976), where the court held that § 1964 could be invoked to prevent
or restrain illegal enterprises not otherwise connected with legitimate businesses.
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Rome, 598 F.2d 564, 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1979) ("enterprise" has a "broad
and unrestricted use" which includes illegal enterprises).
100. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
101. Id. at 106.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 106-07.
105. Id. at 107.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 108.
108. Id. at 109.
109. Id. at 111.
110. 605 F.2d 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1979).
111. Id.
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understanding of the legislative history. The court found the Act's definition
of enterprise to be vague and inadequate. 1 2 Moreover, the court rejected the
government's statutory interpretation in favor of one that gave meaning to
each element of the crime.'i 3
The opinion cited Senator McClellan's explanation that the purpose of the
statute was "to prevent racketeers from infiltrating . . . legitiinate businesses."114 The court met the loophole argument of Altese by noting that the
appellants did not engage in the 11
"form
of racketeering activity for which
5
RICO was exclusively designed."'
United States v. Sutton was wrongly decided. Congress had intended to
include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, as clearly indicated in the
116
title of the Act.
3. Pattern of Racketeering
Under section 1961(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" is limited so that it
must involve "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred
after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity." There is a conflict in the circuits as to
whether the underlying acts in the pattern of racketeering activity must share
an interdependence among themselves. The Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Elliot found a violation of section 1962(c) where each defendant participated
in the enterprise's affairs through different unrelated crimes. 117 No relationship among the predicate acts themselves was required other than the
requisite nexus to the affairs of the enterprise.' l ' On the other hand, within
the Second Circuit, a district court in United States v. Stofsky found a
violation of section 1962(c) where the defendant's acts consisted of one
continuous course of conduct in which the defendants shared duties and
worked closely together.' 19 The Stofsky court construed "pattern" to require
that the racketeering acts must have been connected with each other by some
kind of common scheme, plan, or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not
simply a series of unconnected acts.120 A pattern has been found where the

112. Id. at 265-66.
113. Id. at 269.
114. Id. at 267. Senator McClennan's remarks may be found at Bills Relating to Organized Crime

Activities and Related Areas of CriminalLaws and Procedures: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1969).
115. Id. at 268.
116. Racketeerlnfluencedand CorruptOrganizations, 84 Stat. 941, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970) (emphasis
added); see C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.12 (1973) (title of statute
relevant in construing legislative intent).
117. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. CGa. 1979);
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no reference to the requirement of

relatedness in statute or legislative history).
118. 571 F.2d at 899.

119. 409 F. Supp. 614.
120. Id. at 609. The court in defining a pattern of racketeering activity relied on the definition found in

the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1976).
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121 results, 122 participants, 123 vicseparate acts have had a similar purpose,
25

tims,124 or methods of commission.
United States v. Elliot is correctly decided. The notion that two predicate
crimes can be related by reference to a common enterprise is consistent with
the legislative history, which defines "pattern" as not "isolated." 126
C. PROSCRIBED ACTIVITIES

1. Section 1962(a): Legal Acquisition with Illegal Funds
Section 1962(a) provides, in part, that: "it is unlawful for any person who
has received any income derived. . . from a pattern of racketerring activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt, . . . to use or invest . . . such
income . . . in the acquisition of any enterprise which is engaged in . . .
interstate or foreign commerce."
The section explicitly exempts from its prohibition a purchase of securities
of any one class if less than one per cent is purchased, and such purchase does
not confer upon the purchaser the power to elect one or more directors.
The objective of this provision is to prevent criminal syndicates from
obtaining a foothold in legitimate enterprises by using funds from racketeering activities for investment purposes.127 The critical element of the offense is
the illegitimate source of investment capital. The acquisition of the enterprise
may otherwise be totally legal. Thus, this section is distinct from section
1962(b) which criminalizes the illegal acquisition or maintenance of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The prerequisite for the
application of subsection (a) is the use of income from racketeering activity to
attain control of a business. Subsection (b) does not demand the use of income
for the procurement of the business. For example, foreclosing on a usurious
loan is a mechanism for attaining control over an enterprise. 28 Because this
121. United States v. DeFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979) (where activity included multiple acts of
arson and use of mails to defraud insurance company); United States v. Clemmes, 577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir.
1978) (activity involved interstate transportation of prostitutes and establishment of prostitution business);
United States v. Burnsed, 566 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1977) (police accepted money and services of prostitutes
in return for protection of illegally operated clubs and gambling establishments).
122. United States v. Nacrelli, 468 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.Pa. 1979) (mayor was involved in protection
racket for gambling activities).
123. United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendants engaged in several card games
over nineteen-month period to defraud tourists).
124. United States v. Chavanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (one victim defrauded six times).
125. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (five acts of mail fraud); United States
v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (repeated solicitation and acceptance of bribes to protect gambling,
prostitution and illicit manufacture, distribution and sale of whiskey); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855
(7th Cir. 1977) (shop steward received money from employer for four and one-half years); United States v.
Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975) (officials of trade union accepted payments from employers).
126 S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., IstSess. 158 (1969).
127. Note, Title IX-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, note 53 supra.
128. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 190 (1967) (four principal methods by which organized

crime gains control of legitimate business are cited: (1) extortion; (2) investment of profits acquired from
gambling and other illegal activities; (3) acceptance of interests in business as payment for the owner's
gambling debts; (4) foreclosure on usurious loans).
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would not involve a take over by means of the income from the unlawful debt,
section 1962(a) would be 29inapplicable. Section 1962(b), on the other hand,
would ban this conduct.1
Section 1962(a) can be employed to curb the infiltration of organized crime
into labor unions. United States v. Alvaradol30 is an example of section
1962(a)'s applicability when the funds invested in an enterprise are derived
from labor racketeering activities. The defendant, a trustee of the San Diego
County Construction Laborer's Pension Fund, was indicted for a section
1962(a) violation.' 3' The pattern of racketeering activity involved multiple
allegations of embezzlement from the Pension Fund. The defendant and other
Pension Fund trustees voted themselves "deferred compensation" to which
they were not entitled, and fraudulent "expense" advances which were not
repaid.
The prosecution's theory was that the embezzled funds were invested in the
defendant's own company, the Fringe Benefits Administration Services,
Incorporated ("FBAS"). The defendant then arranged for the payment of
huge fees by the Pension Fund to FBAS for the administration of the trust
funds.
A section 1962(a) violation was based on the funneling of funds gained
through labor racketeering activity into an enterprise. 3 2 If convicted the
defendant would be subject to RICO's criminal forfeiture provisions, 133 and
would forfeit his 100% ownership of FBAS.
This case illustrates that section 1962(a) is relevant to labor racketeering in
two circumstances: (1) where the underlying crimes used to show the pattern
of racketeering activity are labor racketeering offenses; or (2) where the illicit
funds are infused into an enterprise that is associated with or interferes with
union activities. In Alvarado both of these circumstances existed.
Despite section 1962(a)'s apparent applicability to the investment of funds
gained through corrupt labor practices, the section is very rarely used in
prosecutions. This is because of the extreme difficulty of proving that income
invested in an enterprise had as its origin racketeering practices. 134 Direct
proof linking the invested income to racketeering activity is available only on
rare occasions,135 because of money's fungible nature. This problem is
129. See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) (§ 1962(b) conviction for
defendant's obtaining control of a casino through fraudulent inducement of a foreclosure action against the
original owner), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
130. Cr. No. 76-318 (S.D. Cal. 1976). This case is abstracted in DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
DIVISION, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION STATUTE (4th ed. 1978).
131. The defendant was also indicted for multiple counts of embezzling funds under 18 U.S.C. § 664
(1976).
132. An alternative theory of prosecution under § 1962(a) is that the administrative fees paid by the
pension fund to FBAS was embezzlement, adding to the net worth of the defendant's company. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS STATUTE 7

(4th ed. 1978).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
134. Schultz, supra note 67, at 1510 (difficulties of proving a § 1962(a) violation cripple prosecutions).
135. For a case where direct evidence was employed to prove the investment of dirty money in an
enterprise, see United States v. McNary, Cr. No. 77 CR 1023 (N.D. Il1. 1976). The former mayor of
Lansing, Illinois, allegedly received substantial sums of money to approve the rezoning of property and to
process building permits. The bribery payments were in the form of checks deposited directly to the
account of the B & M Manufacturing Company, the defendant's enterprise. This case is abstracted in DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS STATUTE

10 (4th ed. 1978).
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compounded by evidence that criminal syndicates
keep records demonstrating their income has legitimate origins. 136
Therefore, the government is generally forced to rely on inferences drawn
from the circumstances surrounding investments. An inference that income
invested in a business was attained through racketeering would be valid only
if it could be proven that the defendant had insufficient legitimate funds for
the investment. On occasion the government achieves the requisite information concerning the defendant's finances to draw this inference. For example,
in United States v. McPartland,137 Internal Revenue Service agents could trace
the channeling of funds derived from narcotics sales into a restaurant
business. The defendants' legitimate net worth was computed and found to
be significantly lower than the amount of money invested in the business. 138
Thus, it was more likely than not that funds invested in the enterprise were
derived from racketeering activity.
Ordinarily, however, the government does not have the information
necessary for an analysis of how much of an investor's income is legitimately
gained and how much is rooted in racketeering activities. 139 As a result, it is
not often possible to infer from the circumstances of an investment that funds
were derived from racketeering activity. The only alternative available to the
government is to establish that some of the income claimed to be legitimate is
in fact derived from an investment of "dirty" money. Unfortunately, it is also
very difficult to establish that specific funds were "laundered."'140
The trouble the government has in establishing a link between racketeering
activity and investments severely limits the number of successful prosecutions
under section 1962(a). As a result, any intended remedial or regulatory effect
of the prohibition on investing dirty money1 41 is negligible. In addition,
because of its evidentiary limitations section 1962(a) has been overshadowed
as a weapon against labor racketeering by the prohibitions on acquisitions of
enterprises 42 and the conducting of enterprises 43 through patterns of
racketeering activity.

136. See D.

CRESSEY, THE THEFT OF THE NATION

(1976);

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45

(1969).
137. Cr. No. 76-52 (D. Or. 1976). This case is abstracted in DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION,
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS STATUTE 5 (4th ed. 1978).

138. Id.

139. Schultz, supra note 67, at 1512.
140. See generally Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a
Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 8-34(1966).
141. The legislative history for this section is slim. It can be argued, however, that criminalization of
investing dirty money was meant as a social policy to deter corruption of business and to remove obstacles
to fair economic competition. See Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 1, 84 Stat. 941 (Finding 4) (fImding that organized
crime activities harm innocent investors and competing businesses); Note, Organized Crime and the
Infiltration of Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity", 124 U., PA. L. REV. 192, 212 (1975)
(§ 1962(a) can be interpreted as a regulatory measure to promote commerce by guaranteeing fair
competition for investment funds within an industry).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976); notes 144-52 infra and accompanying text.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976); note 153 infra and accompanying text.
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2. 1962(b)-Illegal Acquisition Through Illegal Means
Section 1962(b) provides, in part, that "it is unlawful through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire or
maintain directly or indirectly any interest, or control of any enterprise which
is engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce."
This section outlaws the acquisition or maintenance of any interest or
control in any enterprise through illegal activity. The gravamen of the crime
is the illegal acquisition or maintenance of an interest or control. Common
proscribed methods include acquisitions through extortion or a scheme to
defraud. An interest may, for example, be maintained through bribery. As in
the other subsections of the statute, the words "directly or indirectly" are
used here. Thus, acquisition, maintenance, or control of an enterprise may be
direct or indirect.
For example, in United States v. Parness,144 Milton Parness was convicted
under section 1962(b) and on three counts of interstate transportation of
stolen property.145 The latter three counts formed the pattern of racketeering
activity which consisted of transporting money and a victim across state lines
to perpetuate a scheme to defraud the victim of his ninety percent stock
interest in a foreign hotel and casino.146
Parness gained control of the casino operation by his dominance of all
gambling junkets from the United States to the foreign hotel-casino. 147 Since
the hotel's continued financial success depended on the additional income
from gambling junkets to the casino, he controlled the revenue which was the
life blood of the hotel-casino operation. 148 His scheme to defraud the victim
involved withholding collections from the hotels, thereby placing them in a
position where they had to borrow from third parties to meet their day-to-day
obligations.149 Rather than paying the hotels the money due them, Parness
through straw men loaned the hotel funds to meet their third-party obliga5
tions.150 The straw men foreclosed, and Parness seized control of the hotels.' 1
Although Parness thus acquired control indirectly, the court found his
activities violated section 1962.152
3. 1962(c)--Illegal Use of Enterprise
Section 1962(c) of RICO makes it unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce to conduct or
participate in that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or the collection of an unlawful debt. 153 The constitutionality of this
provision has been upheld. 54 To violate this section, an individual must be
144. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

503 F.2d at 438.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 434-35.

151. Id. at 436.
152. Id. at 437.

153. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
154. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.

1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
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"employed or associated with"1 55 an enterprise. This language has been
construed broadly by the district courts to include both formal and informal
associations15 6 and silent partners.'"
58
The acts proscribed by section 1962(c) apply to "any enterprise."'
"Enterprise" is defined in section 1961(4) as including "any individual
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, in any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."' 159 This
definition has been read to include the various forms an enterprise can take.
In United States v. Stofsky,160 the court stated that "the perversion of a

legitimate business may take many forms .

. .

. No good reason suggests

itself as to why Congress should want to cover some but not all these

forms."' 161 The statutory language itself supports this view; it imposes no

limiting language on the word "enterprise."' 162 It has been interpreted to
encompass legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, 163 and public and private
also broadly construed the term
enterprises. 164 The lower courts have
165
"interstate and foreign commerce."'
This section prohibits individuals from conducting or participating in an
enterprise's affairs in a pattern of racketeering activity. The words "conduct"
and "participate" have been interpreted as requiring some involvement in the
166
either directly or indirectly. 167
operation or management of the enterprise,
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
156. United States v. McMangle, 437 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (persons handling embezzled checks
for illegal check cashing enterprise are an association).
157. United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Pa. 1977) (silent partner of enterprise considered
inside and part of enterprise). But see id. (magistrates who received commission from illegal bond service
not considered associated with enterprise).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
160. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
161. 409 F. Supp. at 613.
162. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
163. United States v. Roe, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979) (illegitimate enterprise conducted through
pattern of racketeering falls within RICO); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978) (enterprise
includes those organized for illicit purposes); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977)
(illicit prostitution activity constitutes enterprise); United States v. Hanson, 422 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Wis.
1976) affd, 583 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.) (defrauding insurance companies by mail and acts of arson constitutes
an enterprise), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978). Contra, United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D.
Conn. 1975) (legislative history shows that Congress only meant to extend statute to legitimate businesses
and did not intend to include illegitimate ones).
164. United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1977) (state agency charged with enforcing tax
laws is an enterprise); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (city of Macon police
department is an enterprise); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Philadelphia
Redevelopment Authority is an enterprise). Contra, United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md.
1976) (RICO does not include public entities and a state is not a legal entity or enterprise for purposes of
this statute), affd, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
165. United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Philadelphia municipal traffic court
affects interstate commerce); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (bribes paid to

state legislator to insure entrance to state medical schools have an impact on interstate commerce because
out-of-state applicants may not be accepted).
166. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) (transfer of partnership interest did not
constitute the conduct of the business through a pattern of racketeering activity even if transfer is part of an
alleged pay-off and mail fraud scheme).
167. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (where defendant charged with illegal
payments and loans to labor union, prosecution only needs to show defendant did the acts and does not
have to prove that he advanced union by illegal means or that union authorized defendant to do acts).
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Moreover, the pattern of racketeering activities alleged
must be proven to be
168
related to the affairs of the enterprise in question.
The crux of a section 1962(c) prosecution lies in the proof of a "pattern of
racketeering activity."' 169 As mentioned earlier, there is a conflict in the
circuits 70
on the issue of whether such a pattern may be shown by unrelated
crimes. 1
4. Section 1962(d)-Conspiracy
Section 1962(d) provides that it is unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c). This section
prohibits conspiracies to violate the substantive sections of the statute. It is an
important prosecutorial tool because it makes conspiracy subject to the same
severe penalties and sanctions as the substantive offenses.
Courts have determined that the general federal conspiracy law 171makes 72
a
common agreement or objective an essential element of a single conspiracy.1
As a consequence, there is a diminished likelihood that multi-faceted,
syndicated criminal activity would be found to be one conspiracy. 173 RICO
removes this prosecutorial barrier by formulating racketeering offenses which
support the connection between crimes and parties that courts had previously
been less willing to recognize. RICO extends the reach of prior conspiracy law
by criminalizing the maintenance or infiltration of an "enterprise" through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Section (d) then allows the prosecution of the
huge and diversified pattern as a single conspiracy.174 As a result, section (d)
suggests the concept of an "enterprise" conspiracy
in addition to the more
75
limited "wheel" and "chain"-type conspiracies.
168. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (convictions reversed as appellants' acts of
racketeering not shown to be related to affairs of enterprise); United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th
Cir. 1977) (proof of connection between racketeering activities and business in question required to make
out violation of § 1962(c)); United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (defendant's
unlawful collection of debts from fellow employees at place of work did not establish a nexus between the
prohibited activity and the conduct of the enterprise's affairs).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
170. See notes 117-25 supra and accompanying text.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
172. See, e.g., Canella v. United States, 157 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1946); Marcante v. United States, 49 F.2d
156 (10th Cir. 1931); Jezewski v. United States, 13 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 735 (1926).
173. Cf. Parnell v. United States, 64 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1932) (employee of still operator not part of
conspiracy); Jezewski v. United States, 13 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 735 (1926) (employee
of brewery owner not proven to have sufficient knowledge of the owner's intention to manufacture with an
illegally high alcohol content). Contra, United States v. Anderson, 101 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.) (single
conspiracy found with statewide efforts to unionize coal fields by obstructing movement of railroads), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 625 (1939).
174. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1050 (1978). The
evidence presented at trial implicated the six defendants and thirty-seven unindicted co-conspirators in
more than twenty different criminal schemes. Id. at 884. As the court noted, "the enterprise involved in
this case probably could not have been successfully prosecuted as a single conspiracy under the general
federal conspiracy statute." Id. at 902.

175. The "wheel" metaphor was used to describe a situation in which one person (the "hub")
participated in a number of otherwise separate conspiracies (the "spokes"). Courts using this rationale
required the prosecution to show that the people forming the spokes were aware of one another and had
done something to further a single, illegal enterprise. This interaction between the conspirators was the
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Because of the breadth of the "enterprise" offenses, it is less essential for
the court to discover a specific uniform objective on the part of interdependent conspirators. It is sufficient if there exists a broad conspiratorial
objective to become involved in and conduct an enterprise through a pattern
of corrupt activities. Clearly, there must still be an agreement. But an
agreement merely to commit the predicate crimes establishing a pattern of
racketeering would not be enough to support a RICO conspiracy conviction.176 Rather, the statute has simply defined the objective of the agreement
more broadly by establishing broad substantive racketeering prohibitions.
Conspiracy can therefore be established where the defendants have agreed to
participate in the furtherance of an enterprise's affairs by committing the
underlying offenses. 177 That the underlying offenses may be totally unrelated
need not be a barrier to a successful prosecution for conspiracy under RICO.
Instead, the key element is proof that the various crimes were performed in
order to assist the enterprise's involvement in corrupt endeavors. Since the
broad objective necessary to establish an enterprise conspiracy allows the
tying together of seemingly unrelated crimes, section (d) has added an
important weapon to the prosecutorial arsenal and filled a void left by the
narrowness of the general conspiracy statute.
Section 1962(d) provides a powerful tool for the prosecution of labor
racketeering, particularly when the conspiracy is to violate sections 1962(b)
and (c). As noted, the syndicates involved with labor unions may not be
amenable to prosecution under the federal conspiracy law. Their increased
vulnerability under section 1962(d) was demonstrated in United States v.
Campanale.7 8 Officials of the Los Angeles Teamsters Local 626 were
convicted for a RICO conspiracy, Hobbs Act extortion, 179 unlawful payments
to a labor organization, 8 0 and obstruction of justice,' 81 as components of a

general scheme to monopolize the meat loading business in that city. These
activities constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. The ordinary conspiratorial prerequisite for the commission of overt acts in furtherance of the
"rim" that enclosed the spokes and completed the wheel. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755
(1946) (eight separate conspiracies existed where the only connection between the different groups was the
fact that each had used the same broker to handle fraudulent applications for housing loans); Canella v.
United States, 157 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1946) (five separate conspiracies existed where the only thing that
they had in common was the involvement of the same Army Quartermaster).
The "chain" concept was used in cases in which each defendant was a necessary "link" in a "chain" of
criminal activity. It allowed persons who had no contact with each other to be jointly prosecuted as coconspirators, provided that the nature of the conspiracy was such that participation in one of its stages
necessarily implied an awareness of the other stages. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947)
(the owner, sales manager, and salesman of a liquor store were held to be co-conspirators in a plot to sell
whiskey at prices higher than those allowed by the Office of Price Administration); United States v. Cirillo,
468 F.2d 1233, 1233 (2d. Cir. 1972) ("This case is the archetype of a 'chain' conspiracy with links
connecting the conspirators at the critical nexus points of exportation, transportation, and distribution of
narcotics."); United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir. 1939) (a group of narcotics smugglers,
retailers and buyers were all part of a single conspiracy). For an excellent discussion of the "wheel,"
"chain" and "enterprise" rationales, see United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 900-03 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 902.
178. 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
180. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).

181. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1510 (1976).
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conspiracy was satisfied by the perpetration of the substantive underlying
offenses. The defendants' agreement was to commit these offenses in the
course of their association with the Teamsters Union, the relevant enterprise.
Therefore, the required "common overall objective" was the conspirators'
intention to further the union's participation in the monopolization scheme.
D. CIVIL REMEDIES

Broad civil remedies and harsh civil penalties may also be imposed under
RICO.182 Patterned after antitrust legislation, section 1964 provides for
"appropriate" injunctive relief for engaging in conduct prohibited by the
statute.18 3 The court may enjoin any individual or corporation from investing
in or operating the prohibited type of enterprise in the future, and is
specifically authorized to order divestiture or dissolution. 84 The statute also
provides for treble damages for any injured person. 185 Civil remedies have
been rarely used, 18generally,
and have virtually never been employed in
6
racketeering cases.
III. RICO AND THE Scotto DECISION
The indictment against Anthony Scotto for corrupt activities in connection
with the operation of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)187
furnishes an excellent example of the application of RICO to labor racketeering activities.
Scotto, president of Local 1814 (Brooklyn) of the ILA, was "a rising star in
the labor world where it was assumed he would soon succeed Thomas W.
Gleason as president of the 16,000 member ILA, and perhaps eventually...
take the reigns of the AFL-CIO."188 Named in the Senate Report accompanying Title IX as a capodecina in the Carlo Gambino "family,"' 189 Scotto was
182.18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976). In United States v. Cappetto, the court upheld the scheme of parallel civil
enforcement of the Act against the claim that it was punitive, not remedial in nature, and therefore
unconstitutional. 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
183. Blakey Speech, supra note 47, at 17-18.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
186. Blakey suggests that civil actions,which require a lesser burden of proof, are often overlooked by
prosecutors who are experienced in criminal prosecutions. Blakey Speech, supra note 47, at 19.
187. Indictment, United States v. Scotto, Cr. No. S-79 CR32, Nov. 15, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Scotto
Indictment]. Anthony Scotto was convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment and a $75,000 fine.
Anthony Anastasio was also convicted and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 1980, § B at 1, col. 5. Barron's reported that the crucial evidence in Scotto's conviction was
the thirty-two court-ordered wiretaps and bugs. Welling, On the Waterfront, BARRON'S, Jan. 21, 1980, at 4.
The recordings played for the jury apparently outweighed the favorable testimony given by Governor
Hugh L. Cary, former New York Mayors Robert Wagner and John V. Lindsay and Lane Kirkland,
President of the AFL-CIO. Id. at 28.
The Scotto case is used in this article for illustrative purposes and for that reason is treated in great
detail. Nothing herein should be viewed as a comment on the defendants' guilt or innocence, or as a
statement on the merits of the legal issues which may be raised during the course of the appellate process.
188. Welling, On the Waterfront, BARRON'S, Jan. 21, 1980, at 8.
189. S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1969). A capodecina is a division chief within an
organized crime family. Id.
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indicted as part of a continuing, massive investigation into waterfront
corruption by the Justice Department's UNIRAC (acronym for union
racketeering) unit involving more than 100 FBI agents.1 90 The indictment
charges that Scotto, as a representative of ILA employees received numerous
unlawful payments totalling over $300,000 from employers of ILA members,
in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186(b).191 Scotto allegedly accepted $210,000 on
eighteen separate occasions from John A. McGrath Corporation, 192 $94,000
in cash and merchandise on fourteen occasions from Quin Marine Services,
Inc., 193 $3,000 from C.C. Lumber Co. and American Navigation Co.,194
$15,000 on three occasions from Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance Inc. and
Marina Repair Services, Inc., 195 and $11,500 on four occasions from Marina
Repair Services Inc. 196 These payments were made to Scotto for a number of
purposes. First, they represented an effort to reduce the number of fraudulent
and exaggerated accident claims filed by ILA members against their employers. 197 Second, the payments were made to prevent employers from losing
waterfront related business. 198 Finally, the employers sought to secure
additional business in exchange for the payments to Scotto.1 99
The indictment also alleges that Scotto committed various fraudulent acts
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1342.200 Scotto devised a scheme to
defraud Prudential Lines, Inc., of the services of one of its officers in order to
obtain cash payments. 20 1 Further, the scheme entailed the fraudulent procurement of a lease between Prudential Lines and the owner of a warehouse. 202
Finally, the indictment points to numerous meetings between Scotto and
codefendants and employers in an effort to demonstrate the existence of
sufficient overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy charged pursuant to
section 1962(d). 203
These activities were sufficient to support an indictment against Scotto for
violation of section 1962(c), which prohibits a person associated with or
employed by an enterprise from conducting the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of labor racketeering. Clearly, Scotto is a "person" within
the meaning of the statute. 20 4 Moreover, Scotto is employed as president by
the relevant enterprise,
the ILA.205 Labor unions ordinarily are considered
"enterprises." 20 6 The ILA is, of course, an enterprise which affects interstate
190. Welling, On the Waterfront,

BARRON'S,

Jan. 21, 1980, at 4.

191. Id.

192. Id. at 5.
193. Id. at 20.
194. Id. at 9.
195. Id. at 11.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.

201. Id. at 19.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id. at 14.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976); see notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text.
Scotto Indictment at 14.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976); see notes 78-98 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v.

Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence that defendant conducted affairs of a local union by serving
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and foreign commerce, the jurisdictional requirement for RICO's application.207 Finally, the prerequisite that the enterprise be conducted through a
pattern of racketeering activity 208 is satisfied by the discovery of at least two
acts of racketeering. 209 The alleged violations by Scotto of 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)
and 18 U.S.C. § 1341210 are specifically enumerated within the definition of
those actions qualifying as racketeering activities. 211 These violations occurred after the effective date of the statute and212
the last act occurred within
ten years after the commission of a prior act.
Although not explicitly required by the Act, courts have demanded that
there be some nexus or relationship between the individual activities in order
for a pattern of racketeering activity to exist.213 Proof of such a nexus is not
difficult in this case. First, the huge number of similar fraud and kickback
violations evidence the existence of an organized plan among ILA officers to
use the union to maximize personal profits. 21 4 The indictment furnishes
another nexus between the violations in the allegation that Scotto enlisted
many members and employers of ILA labor to assist him in the ongoing
pattern of racketeering activity.
Scotto's activities, in coordination with those of his codefendants, are also
sufficient to support an indictment for a violation of section 1962(d), which
prohibits conspiracies to violate substantive provisions of the Act. 215 Such a
conspiracy requires an agreement, either overt or implicit, to conduct an
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The alleged
consensus between Scotto and Anthony Anastasio, 216 the vice president of
ILA, to conduct ILA's affairs by unlawfully obtaining money from employers2 17 and by devising schemes to defraud Prudential Shipping Lines, 218
provides the necessary agreement element of the conspiracy charge. Numerous activities outlined in the indictment qualify as the overt acts that must
be committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. For example, the meetings
between Scotto and an officer of Prudential Shipping Lines concerning the
bribe-induced lease for a warehouse 219 is an overt act pursuant to the
agreement to defraud Prudential Lines. These acts demonstrate a conspiracy
as chief steward and accepted payment as a union steward from contractors for services which were not
rendered was sufficient to show that his actions were in the conduct of the union's affairs and that he thus
was engaged in an "enterprise").
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
210. Scotto Indictment at 1.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976); see notes 115-19 supra and accompanying text. The Scotto Indictment
alleges continual racketeering activity from Jan. 1, 1974 until the date of the indictment. Scotto Indictment,
Intro.
213. See notes 115-25 supra and accompanying text.
214. See United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence that defendant engaged in
prohibited activity for a period of four and one-half years was sufficient to show a "pattern of racketeering
activity"); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (evidence that defendant engaged in
numerous identical fraudulent card games over a nineteen-month period was sufficient to show a "pattern
of racketeering activity").
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976).
216. Anastasio also is a codefendant. Scotto Indictment at 11.
217. 1d.
218. Id. at 14.
219. Id.

1980]

RICO AND LABOR RACKETEERING

to use the union as a mechanism of the commission of criminal acts that form
a pattern of racketeering activity. As a final note, it should be observed that
any interest in and contractual rights Scotto may have with the ILA are
subject to the forfeiture provisions provided by the criminal penalties section
of RICO.222 This forfeiture penalty supplements the more usual criminal

sanction of incarceration.
IV. CONCLUSION

Clearly, control of syndicated crime and labor racketeering will not be
achieved by standard law enforcement practices. It is not sufficient for the
police to investigate isolated crimes, solve them and present them to a
prosecutor for formal proceedings. The concepts of investigation, prosecution
and incarceration must be employed as part of predetermined strategy if they
are to be effective in an organized crime context.
Such a strategy must be based on a very real understanding of the nature of
the illicit activity. Economic analysis, historical perspective and an inquiry
into the structure of affected institutions are essential aspects of an analysis of
the factors which result in certain unions being dominated by the underworld. 22 1 The development of any such strategy must also recognize the
need to utilize a variety of legal remedies as a means of reinstituting
democratic processes within syndicate-dominated unions.
RICO provides the flexibility required to implement a comprehensive
strategy in the labor racketeering area. To the extent that it is used
appropriately and with discretion, it offers significant potential to affect what
is clearly a national problem.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976) (whoever violates RICO shall be fined and shall forfeit any interest he
has acquired in violation of § 1962, and any interest in, security of, claim against or property or
contractual right over the applicable "enterprise"). See generally Taylor, supra note 65.
221. Such a study has been conducted by the Cornell Institute on Organized Crime. See G. BLAKEY, R.
GOLDSTOCK, & G. BRADLEY, LABOR RACKETEERING-BACKGROUND MATERIALS (1979).

